To: Director of Private Office
cc: Director, Economics Directorate
    Secretary, IMS
    Sovietologist-in-Residence
From: ASG for Political Affairs
Subject: Mazowiecki's visit to the Soviet Union (23-27 November)

Summary

1. A visit marking the official secularisation of Soviet-Polish relations, though the CPSU will continue to deal closely with the PZPR. Mazowiecki affirms Poland's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. Warnings from both sides about German unification.

Detail

2. This was Mazowiecki's first official visit to the Soviet Union. It represented the fullest public recognition yet by the Soviet Union of the political changes which have taken place in Poland. Mazowiecki voiced Poland's concern to put bilateral relations on a definitely new footing and to rid them of the nightmares of the past. He paid homage at Katyn ("an unhealed wound"), but without attributing blame to the Soviets. He spoke of the rights of the Polish minority in Belorussia and the Western Ukraine. He received a particularly warm welcome in Leningrad, the traditional centre of Russian-Polish intellectual ties.

Meeting with Gorbachev

3. Gorbachev spoke approvingly of the changes in Poland which he said illuminated the fundamental issues of Soviet-Polish relations. A good relationship with Poland was one of the "permanent strategic elements of Soviet foreign policy". Gorbachev praised Jaruzelski for his contribution to the improvement in this relationship.

4. Mazowiecki also stressed the importance of developing bilateral co-operation and the need to modernise economic relations. He reportedly expressed regret at the actions of "extremist forces" in Poland who had tried to cloud Polish-Soviet relations. He confirmed that membership of the Warsaw Pact was in Poland's national interests.
5. On changes in Eastern Europe, both leaders agreed that positive political processes were gaining strength in Europe. It was important that events in Eastern Europe should not disrupt stability. They "positively assessed" statements by Western leaders that they did "not intend to use the changing situation to try to revive political confrontation". At the same time, "serious concern" was expressed about "the revival of revanchist sentiments in connection with events in the GDR which, unless passions were cooled, could encourage infringements of the post-war borders of Europe".

Meeting with Ryzhkov

6. The discussion concentrated on economic co-operation. Mazowiecki told Ryzhkov that Poland intended to remain a member of the CMEA. New methods were needed to transfer to accounting in a freely convertible currency on the basis of international prices, which would allow both countries to take a more active part in world economic affairs. The CMEA itself required radical systemic change and its members should take more active part in the "integration processes in Europe".

Joint declaration

7. The joint declaration, issued on 27 November, referred inter alia to:

- joint efforts to restructure the CMEA;
- to resolve the Katyn issue;
- "natural and historically-substantiated processes taking place in European socialist countries as being within the framework of democratisation and the exercise of the right of nations to free choice";
- confidence that relations between the two German states, based on mutual respect for sovereignty, for the realities that formed in Europe in the post-war period, on the observance of the principle of the inviolability of state frontiers are of utmost importance for the preservation of stability and security in Europe";
- that the forthcoming meeting between Presidents Gorbachev and Bush would be of "much importance" for the development of the world situation.
Comment

8. The visit appears to have been handled with caution and tact on both sides. Public statements by Mazowiecki and the Soviet leaders, as well as the joint declaration, emphasised the new departure in Soviet-Polish relations; their deideologisation; efforts to close the pages of the past, while looking forward to a new era based on enlightened national self-interest, including respect for alliance obligations. At the same time, they produced some very old-sounding language on the German question, no doubt calculated to go down well in Warsaw and Moscow, if not to be taken too seriously elsewhere.

9. There is another side to the coin, however. Despite Mazowiecki's assertion that any Polish government would work for the best possible relations with Moscow, and the Soviet leaders' apparent acceptance of this, it is clear from the latter's recent messages of support to Rakowski and other public dealings with the Polish Party, that the CPSU has not given up on the PZPR. Indeed, it is reported that the Soviets have insisted on continuing PZPR involvement in all contacts between the two countries (and not just e.g. through Jaruzelski's and Siwicki's attendance at Warsaw Pact meetings). We believe that this must have been, implicitly at least, Moscow's condition for doing business with Mazowiecki and other Solidarity ministers in the first place. It is also consistent with Shevardnadze's remarks to the Supreme Soviet on 17th November, when he bracketed Soviet support for the Mazowiecki government with the latter's acceptance of continuing close links between the CPSU and the PZPR.

10. This suggests that Moscow will continue to press for the maintenance of close inter-Party ties as the sine qua non for good relations with any reformist government in Eastern Europe. If so, developments in the GDR may give the Soviets particular anxiety, were the SED to follow the Hungarian option and virtually remove the basis for such contacts. It may also explain the enthusiasm with which Gorbachev has publicly greeted the advent of Urbanek as General Secretary of the Czechoslovak CP.

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