POLAND'S EASTERN POLICY: THE DEVELOPING NOTION OF "EUROPEANIZATION"

SUMMARY

Polish foreign policy circles are thinking through next steps in their country's eastern policy, seeking ways to buttress regional stability and reduce the potential for nationalist excess in the emerging post-Soviet states. The Poles are very aware of the size and power of Russia and concerned about the issue of the Polish minority in Lithuania. But the Ukraine has for many become a locus of particular concern; our contacts throughout the GOP increasingly raise the GOU's alleged desire to build a large army and, possibly, to retain control over nuclear weapons. While the "GOP's "two-track policy" of developing in parallel with the Soviet center and the republics remains valid, policy planners are thinking over a post-"two-track" approach, which many give the informal label of "Europeanization."

As described to us, "Europeanization" means rapidly drawing the post-Soviet states into European institutions (initially the CSCE, CoE and CFE process) with the objective of projecting strict Western standards of conduct in areas such as human and minority rights, democratization and security policy. Most broadly, "Europeanization" is seen as providing a needed underpinning for the development of stable, democratic polities to the east. Its proponents also believe "Europeanization" could help the GOP sidestep domestic pressures to turn potential issues with its eastern neighbors -- Polish minority issues especially -- into emotional bilateral problems. Walesa's senior foreign policy advisor told us on September 24 that "Europeanization" was also intended to tie the U.S. to that process.

Some Poles have suggested "Europeanization" could be a useful tool for drawing an independent Ukraine away from a future resurgent Russia and into a stable, potentially more benign, European order. There are internal GOP differences over how or how fast "Europeanization" would apply to Russia, but some want the policy to have an anti-Moscow (both post-Soviet center and Russian) aspect. How much of an aspect will emerge as the debate continues is not yet clear.
INTERNAL GOP CONSIDERATION OF "EUROPEANIZATION" OF THE POST-SOVIET REPUBLIC-STATES IS AT AN EARLY AND FORMATIVE STAGE. ITS ADVOCATES HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN HEARING FURTHER USG VIEWS ON THE POST-SOVIET UNION, AND HAVE NOTED TO US POINTS AT WHICH USG AND GOP THINKING APPEARS TO BE DEVELOPING IN COMMON DIRECTIONS, ESPECIALLY ON THE CONCEPTUAL PLANE OF TRANSMITTING WESTERN VALUES TO THE EAST. END SUMMARY.

THE PROBLEM

WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH A RANGE OF POLISH FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS THE GOP'S THINKING ABOUT ITS POST-COUP SOVIET POLICY. SPECIALISTS IN THE MFA, NSC STAFF, PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY STAFF AND ELSEWHERE ARE COMING TO BELIEVE POLAND'S ERSTWHILE "TWO-TRACK" POLICY OF DEVELOPING SIMULTANEOUSLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET REPUBLICS AND THE SOVIET CENTER -- A POLICY ENUNCIATED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SKUBISZEWSKI DURING HIS AUTUMN 1990 VISIT TO THE USSR AND THREE CONSTITUENT REPUBLICS -- HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. WHILE INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS ARE IN PROCESS, A NEW NOTION OF "EUROPEANIZATION" IS GAINING CREDENCE AS A CONCEPT AS THE GOP SEEKS TO COPE WITH THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET CENTER.

MFA EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR GRZEGORZ KOSTRZEWA-ZORBAS, ONE OF THE ARCHITECTS OF THE "TWO-TRACK" POLICY, TOLD US SEPTEMBER 14 THAT THE BASIS FOR "TWO-TRACK" WAS GONE: "THE CENTER HAS COLLAPSED AND NOTHING WILL BRING THE SOVIET UNION BACK; THE CENTER CANNOT GUARANTEE ANYTHING ANYMORE -- NOT HUMAN RIGHTS, NOT CONTROL OF THE MILITARY, NOT CONTROL OF SOCIETY." ONE COULD NOT ENSURE STABILITY AND ORDERLY CHANGE THROUGH DEALING WITH THE CENTER. RATHER, ONE HAD TO "ESCAPE FORWARD" TO A NEW SITUATION AND DESIGN A POLICY TO DEAL WITH IT.

"EUROPEANIZATION" OF THE EAST


THE POINT, HE CONTINUED, WAS TO ANCHOR THE NEW STATES INTO LARGE EUROPEAN PROCESSES AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AS THEY ACHIEVED INDEPENDENCE IN ORDER TO TRY TO ENSURE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE USSR'S BREAKUP -- EXCESSES STEMMING FROM NATIONALIST EUPHORIA, PERSECUTION OF MINORITIES, MILITARISM,
BORDER CLAIMS -- WERE PREEMPTED. PROJECTING WESTERN POLITICAL VALUES AND STANDARDS EAST WOULD BE MORE POSSIBLE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, WHEN POSITIONS MIGHT HAVE HARDENED. REFERRING TO THE EXAMPLE OF CSCE AND YUGOSLAVIA, KOSTRZEW- ZORBAS SAID THE EXPERIENCE INDICATED NOT THAT "EUROPEANIZATION" WAS FLAWED, BUT THAT IF IT WERE TO BE SUCCESSFUL IT WOULD HAVE TO BE INTRODUCED VERY EARLY ON. THE EC AND CSCE INVOLVED THEMSELVES IN YUGOSLAVIA VERY LATE IN THE GAME, HE LAMENTED.

MFA EUROPEAN DIRECTOR JERZY SULEK, KOSTRZEW- ZORBAS' IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR AND, UNLIKE THE SOLIDARITY VETERAN KOSTRZEW, A CAREER DIPLOMAT, CONFIRMED FOR US ALSO ON SEPTEMBER 17 THAT "EUROPEANIZATION," THOUGH NOT NOT AN ACCEPTED POLICY, WAS UNDER VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE GOP. HE ECHOED KOSTRZEW- ZORBAS' VIEWS OF THE CONCEPT, ADDING THAT INTRODUCTION OF EUROPEAN STANDARDS ON MINORITY TREATMENT HAD PROVEN A VERY USEFUL MEANS OF COMING TO CLOSURE ON THE ISSUE FOR THE POLISH-GERMAN TREATY, WHICH SULEK NEGOTIATED. THIS PRECEDENT COULD PROVE USEFUL IN APPROACHING MINORITY PROBLEMS TO THE EAST. THE LABEL OF "EUROPEANIZATION" WOULD TEND TO ELEVATE A SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO A LEVEL OF HIGH PRINCIPLE, THUS HELPING PROTECT COMPROMISES FROM DOMESTIC POLITICAL ATTACK BY EXTREMISTS. SULEK AND KOSTRZEW- ZORBAS BOTH SUGGESTED THAT "EUROPEANIZATION" OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN DISPUTE OVER THE POLISH MINORITY, I.E., AGREING TO APPLY "EUROPEAN" OR CSCE STANDARDS, COULD BE PRODUCTIVE.

SULEK ADDED THAT THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF "EUROPEANIZATION" WAS PARAMOUNT IN POLISH THINKING AND STRESSED THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE EMERGING POST-SOVIET STATES INTO THE CFE PROCESS. (ON SEPTEMBER 11, KRZYSZTOF STRONCZYSK, THE MFA'S CSCE EXPERT IN THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS DEPARTMENT, TOLD US HIS OFFICE IS STUDYING THE IMPACT OF A SOVIET BREAKUP ON CFE TREATY IMPLEMENTATION AND BELIEVES THE GOP WILL TRY TO HOLD ALL POST-SOVIET STATES TO CFE LIMITS, THOUGH IT MIGHT BE UP TO THESE STATES TO DETERMINE RELEVANT SUB-LIMITS AMONG THEMSELVES.)

EURO-BLUE HELMETS? WE ASKED OUT INTERLOCUTORS WHETHER PRESIDENT WALES'A S CALL IN PRAGUE ON SEPTEMBER 17 FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.N. OR CSCE MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO HELP CONTAIN POTENTIAL FUTURE NATIONALIST UNREST IN EAST AND CENTRAL EUROPE REFLECTED DISCUSSION OF "EUROPEANIZATION." MOST AGREED IT DID NOT, AT LEAST DIRECTLY. SECRETARY JANUSZ ZIOLKOWSKI, SENIOR FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR ON THE PRESIDENTIAL STAFF, TOLD US WALES'A MADE THE PROPOSAL SPONTANEOUSLY. (THE PREPARED TEXT OF WALES'A REMARKS, AS PROVIDED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS OFFICE, DID NOT NOT INCLUDE THE PROPOSAL; ANDRZEJ TOWPIK, DIRECTOR OF THE MFA'S EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS DEPARTMENT, TOLD US THAT THE MFA HAD NO WARNING ABOUT THE PROPOSAL.) AT THE SAME TIME, ZIOLKOWSKI CONTINUED, WALES'A PROPOSAL STEMMED FROM THE SAME SORT OF CONCERNS THAT WERE DRIVING GOP CONSIDERATION OF "EUROPEANIZATION" -- CONCERN ABOUT THE STABILITY OF THE EMERGING STATES AND THE DESIRE TO INTRODUCE QUICKLY VALUES AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES TO SHAPE THEIR DEVELOPMENT.
ON SEPTEMBER 22, JERZY MAREK NOWAKOWSKI, ZIOLKOWSKI'S SENIOR AIDE ON SOVIET AFFAIRS AND ALSO HEAD OF THE SENATE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMISSION STAFF, TOLD US THAT "EUROPEANIZATION," WHICH HE DESCRIBED IN MUCH THE SAME LANGUAGE AS HAD KOSTRZEWA-ZORBAS AND SULEK, HAD GENERATED A FAIR AMOUNT OF CONSENSUS BEHIND IT AT THE SENIOR STAFF LEVEL, AND THAT SOME VERSION OF IT WAS LIKELY TO BECOME POLICY. INTERNAL DISAGREEMENTS REMAINED, HOWEVER, OVER KEY DETAILS.

"EUROPEANIZATION," THE UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

VIRTUALLY ALL INTERLOCUTORS AGREE THAT A MAJOR OBJECT FOR "EUROPEANIZATION" WOULD BE THE UKRAINE, BUT THEY DISAGREE OVER WHAT THIS COULD MEAN IN PRACTICE. THE UKRAINE HAS BECOME SOMETHING OF AN OBSESSION IN POLISH FOREIGN POLICY CIRCLES, DUE TO CONSIDERABLE EXTENT TO CONCERNS ABOUT NATIONALISM AND UKRAINIAN OFFICIAL INTENTIONS ON SECURITY AND NUCLEAR ISSUES. KOSTRZEWA-ZORBAS, WHO VISITED KIEV AND LVOV IN MID-SEPTEMBER, TOLD US HE WAS CONVINCED NATIONALISM THERE WAS STRONG AND GROWING. HIS CONCERN WAS INTENSIFIED BY WHAT HE SAID WAS VYACHESLAV CHORNOVIL, OF DEVELOPMENT OF A LARGE UKRAINIAN MILITARY AND AN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCE.

THESE CONCERNS ARE SHARED AT VERY HIGH LEVELS HERE: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LECH KACZynski AND DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER JANUSZ ONYSZKIEWICZ BROUGHT UP THEIR CONCERN ABOUT A POTENTIAL UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR FORCE WITH A VISITING USG OFFICIAL ON SEPTEMBER 13. DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR JERZY MILEWSKI TOLD US ON SEPTEMBER 19 THAT A NUCLEAR UKRAINE WAS A GROWING POSSIBILITY AND, A FEW DAYS LATER, A SENIOR POLISH INTELLIGENCE ANALYST TOLD US MUCH THE SAME. ON SEPTEMBER 20, ACCORDING TO JERZY MAREK NOWAKOWSKI, AN INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP MET TO DISCUSS INFORMATION ABOUT AND IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR UKRAINE, CONCLUDING THAT IT WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY AND WOULD NOT BE IN POLAND'S INTERESTS. (COMMENT: WE CANNOT FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE JUDGE THE MERITS OF GOP CONCERNS REGARDING UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. END COMMENT.)

NOWAKOWSKI AND KOSTRZEWA-ZORBAS, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS, HAVE STRESSED THAT "EUROPEANIZATION" COULD HAVE TWO DISCRETE ROLES TO PLAY WITH RESPECT TO THE UKRAINE. FIRST, IT COULD BE USED TO HELP PREVENT RETENTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS BY THE UKRAINE BY INJECTING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION. THE GOP, ACCORDING TO OUR INTERLOCUTORS, WOULD NOT TRY TO ARGUE AGAINST A UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR FORCE DIRECTLY OR MAKE WHAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS ANTI-UKRAINIAN ARGUMENTS AS SUCH, BUT WOULD USE "EUROPEANIZATION" AS COVER TO GENERATE OPPOSITION TO A NUCLEAR UKRAINE. NOWAKOWSKI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS COULD BE DIFFICULT, AS FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES COULD BE CITED BY THE UKRAINIANS AS A "EUROPEAN" PRECEDENT. BUT BETTER A MULTILATERAL, ALL-WESTERN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM THAN A BILATERAL POLISH ONE, HE SAID.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND, AND MORE BROADLY, NOWAKOWSKI SAID "EUROPEANIZATION" WOULD BE USEFUL IN LAYING OUT A DIRECTION FOR THE POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE -- SPECIFICALLY, DEVELOPMENT TOWARD EUROPE AND WITH POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY -- AND NOT BACK TO RUSSIA AND A POST-SOVIET ALLIANCE OR CONFEDERAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE.

NOWAKOWSKI NOTED THERE WAS BROAD CONSENSUS OVER THE FIRST -- NON-NUCLEAR -- OBJECTIVE WITH RESPECT TO "EUROPEANIZATION" AND THE UKRAINE. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECOND -- POLITICAL -- OBJECTIVE. ACCORDING TO NOWAKOWSKI, AND BASED ALSO ON OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THEM, KOSTRZEWIA-ZORBAS AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR JERZY MILEWSKI IN FACT WANT TO SEEK TO USE "EUROPEANIZATION" IN A DIFFERENTIATED FASHION, APPLYING IT IN FULL TO THE WESTERN FORMER SOVIET REPUBLIC-STATES, BUT TO RUSSIA AT A DELIBERATELY SLOWER PACE. (COMMENT: KOSTRZEWIA-ZORBAS' DEPARTMENT HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE POST-SOVIET REPUBLICS, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT POLITICAL TIES WITH THE RSFSR ARE LAGGING BEHIND THOSE WITH THE WESTERN REPUBLICS. ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE HANDLED BY DIFFERENT OFFICES. END COMMENT).

ACCORDING TO NOWAKOWSKI, THE PURPOSE OF AN ACTIVELY DIFFERENTIATED "EUROPEANIZATION" POLICY WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE POLITICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN THE UKRAINE AND RUSSIA. NOWAKOWSKI SAID HE HIMSELF ACCEPTED DIFFERENTIATION, BUT ONLY AS A NATURAL PROCESS RESULTING FROM "OBJECTIVELY" GREATER READINESS ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN REPUBLICS TO MEET EUROPEAN STANDARDS AND NOT AS THE RESULT OF A POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION EXERCISED BY THE WEST. NOWAKOWSKI SAID INTERNAL GOP DIFFERENCES OVER DIFFERENTIATION REFLECTED DIFFERENT OVERALL VIEWS ABOUT RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. HE BELONGED TO A SOFTER-LINE CAMP, AND MILEWSKI AND KOSTRZEWIA-ZORBAS TO A HARDER ONE.

IN OUR SEPTEMBER 24 MEETING, WALESA'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR ZIOLKOWSKI APPEARED TO BE IN THE MIDDLE WITH RESPECT TO DIFFERENTIATION. THE "EUROPEANIZATION" OF RUSSIA WOULD TAKE PLACE AT A MUCH SLOWER PACE, AND POLAND WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN CONDUCTING AN ACTIVIST "EUROPEANIZATION" POLICY WITH THE UKRAINE AND BYELORUSSIA, HE NOTED. HE ADDED THAT THIS DID NOT REFLECT A GOP DESIRE TO ISOLATE RUSSIA, WHICH HE OBSERVED WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AND DAMAGING TO ATTEMPT. RATHER, POLAND'S GREATER INTEREST IN ITS IMMEDIATE EASTERN NEIGHBORS REFLECTED HISTORIC CONCERNS, THE INTENSITY OF SOLIDARITY-ERA TIES WITH UKRAINIAN FORMER DISSIDENTS NOW APPROACHING POWER, AND THE NATURALLY GREATER READINESS OF THE UKRAINIANS AND BYELORUSSIANS THEMSELVES TO EUROPEANIZE. "EUROPEANIZATION," ZIOLKOWSKI STRESSED, POTENTIALLY EMBRACED ALL COUNTRIES THAT ADHERED TO CORE EUROPEAN VALUES, AND RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED.
COMMENT

THE INTERNAL GOP DEBATE ABOUT "EUROPEANIZATION" IS FAR FROM CONCLUDED AND IT IS NOT CLEAR IN WHAT FORM A "EUROPEANIZATION" POLICY WILL EMERGE. SO FAR IT APPEARS TO US TO BE A CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESS, EVEN AT ITS CURRENT STAGE. THE MFA IS PROBABLY RIGHT THAT MINORITY QUESTIONS WOULD BE EASIER TO HEAD OFF OR RESOLVE MULTILATERALLY THAN PURELY BILATERALLY.

MOREOVER, "EUROPEANIZATION" MAY PROVIDE A USEFUL POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE INEXPERIENCED POLISH FOREIGN POLICY MACHINERY AS IT GRAPPLES WITH ISSUES OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECURITY VIS A VIS RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE. "EUROPEANIZATION" MIGHT ALSO PROVE A MECHANISM FOR COORDINATING POLISH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE EAST: WHATEVER THE MOMENTUM BEHIND TRYING TO USE "EUROPEANIZATION" IN A DIFFERENTIATED WAY AT RUSSIA'S EXPENSE, IT IS RUSSIA THAT HAS THE GAS AND OIL RESERVES POLAND NEEDS, AND THE RUSSIAN MARKET FOR POLISH AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER EXPORTS IS POTENTIALLY FAR GREATER THAN THE UKRAINIAN. SO ECONOMICS MAY DISCOURAGE THE POLES FROM DECIDING TO SEEK TO PURSUE A VERY ACTIVE DIFFERENTIATION POLICY.