

MEMORANDUM: *9*

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TO : Director of the Private Office *2*
COPY : *nm* ASG/PA (for Miss O. Sérébriakoff) ~~1107, 1991~~
FROM : *W* Special Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

P. A. Sub - Registry
File N° *19-10-01*

SUBJECT : INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS *(Poland)*

On Thursday, 30 October, Mr. Wojceck Kornacki, a former Polish journalist now resident in the UK and an astute observer of the Polish political scene, addressed a small audience in NATO HQ at my invitation. He was returning to the UK from Poland, where he had been investigating the political situation after the elections. He had several insights into the workings of the inner political system which could have implications for our dealings with the Polish authorities. These are the main points of his comments.

Military Policy

1. The earlier assessment that MoD Admiral Kolodejczyk would soon be replaced by a civilian MoD with a civilian staff has been proved wrong. Far from being a stop gap MoD, and under the thumb of Solidarity, Admiral Kolodejczyk has pursued his own plans most effectively. He has managed to earn the confidence of President Walesa and of the church, and to obtain support for his concept of a future Polish Armed Forces.

This is to be a 'Presidential Army', depoliticized, playing no political role and with no political (parliamentary) involvement, and obedient only to the President via the minister of defence. The army will be motivated by professionalism and patriotism, but would be a self-contained entity.

Comment: The significance of his plan is that it would leave the armed forces virtually untouched by civilian influence, and free to organize their own affairs. This bears a striking resemblance to USSR MoD Lobov's concept of military reform and indeed reflects Soviet General Staff thinking on how best to preserve the existing military system, preventing any effective democratic controls.

Admiral Kolodejczyk is widely believed to be in close contact with the Soviet General Staff. He has certainly spent a lot of his career in the USSR.

This topic will be covered in greater detail in a further memo.


2. President Walesa, at least partly under the influence of the MoD, ceased to use his presidential council, which dissolved itself in protest on 25 October. His State Secretary for Security Matters and former Chief Adviser, Lech Kaczynski, now no longer has the president's ear. The president's chief confidant is now his former chauffeur Wachnowski, who controls access to him. Kaczynski says that he can now only get to Walesa via him, and does not expect to hold his formal post much longer. Deputy MoD Onyskiewicz is said to have no significant influence on military matters and is despised by the radicals as a coward. These same radicals were in the past 'anti-army' and never acquired any military expertise. Consequently there is no alternative position on military reform to put against that of the MoD and no alternative concept of a new army.
3. Rear-Admiral Wawrzyniak, former chef du cabinet of the minister of defence, has now been appointed chief of intelligence and security. He is reported to have been instrumental in undermining Walesa's trust of Kaczynski.
4. The church supports the MoD line because the MoD has 'seduced' the new chaplaincy organization, headed by Bishop Gludz, by providing them lavishly with cars, accommodation and staff to facilitate their pastoral work.

Attitude to West

5. Continued Soviet pressure on Poland, and residual fears of Moscow (Poland was paralyzed for two days by the coup, most officials being convinced that it would be successful) make the new Polish leadership very sensitive to Western attitudes to the USSR. There is a consistent tendency on the part of many former Solidarity activists now in governmental or other senior positions to put the worst possible interpretation on any Western comment which does not unequivocally support the position of the new leadership. For example, the Secretary General's comments during Walesa's visit were reported in an internal report as indicating that "... not only was there no chance of Poland growing closer to NATO, but the USSR would become a member of NATO before Poland did". This black interpretation sees US and Western policy as recognizing the rise of two new centres of influence in Europe, Moscow and Berlin, and Eastern Europe being parcelled out between the two into spheres of influence. Eagleburger's talk with Macarczyk (deputy MFA) on 10 October is interpreted as supporting this theory. Apparently he praised Poland's good relations with the Soviet Union. This is seen as 'pushing Poland into Moscow's arms'.

6. It is noted that much of the MFA and diplomatic corps is still composed of 'old hands'. Whilst the new leaders - former Solidarity activists - do not understand diplomatic nuance (a point which must be borne in mind when talking to them), the diplomats undoubtedly do. However, their goodwill towards the government is in doubt and it is suspected, though not proven, that they may slant or distort views from Western capitals and institutions to reflect their own views.

Comment: I can myself attest to the readiness of many in the radical camp to misinterpret comments and attitudes. Even if the diplomatic corps' failure is restricted to failing to explain diplomatic procedures to their new political masters, this would be sufficient to fuel this misunderstanding to a dangerous degree. This Byzantine readiness to see conspiracy and betrayal in everything, coupled with a complete lack of understanding of normal diplomatic behaviour, could be really dangerous to the stability of our relations with Poland.



CHRIS DONNELLY

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